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INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the Federal Circuit issued thirty five published opinions
involving government contract law issues. For this article, the
decisions have been grouped into the following subject matters:
damages, default, costs, contract interpretation, duress, and bid
protests. This article will emphasize those decisions which the author
believes will most likely affect the greatest volume of future litigated
cases. Among the various decisions handed down by the Federal
Circuit in 2003, the court issued important precedential opinions
regarding damages, default, and costs issues.
I. DAMAGES—THE EICHLEAY DECISIONS
A. P.J. Dick Inc. v. Principi
The use of the Eichleay formula to calculate unabsorbed home
office overhead has been the subject of intense debate in the
1
government contract arena. Since the seminal decision of C.B.C.
2
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States in 1992 limiting the use of the Eichleay
formula to calculate unabsorbed home office overhead, the Federal
Circuit has published fifteen decisions concerning its use—including
3
three in 2003. Two of the 2003 “Eichleay” decisions reflect the
1. See Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Unabsorbed Overhead and the “Eichleay”
Formula: Rampant Confusion, 16 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 23 (2002) [hereinafter Nash &
Cibinic, Rampant Confusion] (explaining that the Eichleay formula produces
significant complexities in pricing the claims of constructing contractors); Ralph C.
Nash & John Cibinic, Unabsorbed Overhead: Abandon Eichleay, 13 NASH & CIBINIC REP.
¶ 33 (1999) (arguing that the Federal Circuit should abandon the use of the Eichleay
formula and create a better means of calculating fixed-cost delay damages); David G.
Anderson, Practitioner’s Viewpoint: Federal Circuit Creates an Invalid Legal Test for
Determining Entitlement to Unabsorbed Overhead, 26 PUB. CONT. L.J. 353, 369, 371 (1997)
(contending that the Eichleay formula unfairly places the burden of proof on the
government to show that the contractor was able to take on other work, thereby
forcing the government to engage in lengthy and expensive discovery that may
produce windfall recoveries for some contractors); Patrick A. McGeehin & Carleton
O. Strouss, Learning from Eichleay: Unabsorbed Overhead Claims in State and Local
Jurisdictions, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 351, 353 (1996) (proposing that state and local
jurisdictions adopt the principles of Eichleay to provide a more uniform formula for
computing unabsorbed overhead); Colonel Killham, Federal Circuit Endorses Eichleay,
ARMY LAW., July 1994, at 37 (stating that the Eichleay formula can assist contracting
officers by placing limits on contractors’ ability to increase overhead pools or
allocation formulas); Major Tomanelli, The Eichleay Formula—Struggling to Survive,
ARMY LAW., Dec. 1993, at 46-48 (outlining three arguments that can limit the
applicability of the Eichleay formula so that contracting officers will not reimburse
contractors unnecessarily).
2. 978 F.2d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
3. P.J. Dick Inc. v. Principi, 324 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Charles G.
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continuing difficulty created by the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence in
this area, and mark important developments in the case law.
4
In P.J. Dick Inc. v. Principi, the contractor appealed the Department
of Veterans Affairs Board of Contract Appeals decision denying P.J.
Dick’s (“PJD”) claims for unabsorbed home office overhead damages.
During performance of the construction contract, the government
issued over 400 change orders, causing delays to various aspects of
5
the project. The Board granted PJD a time extension and damages
6
for field overhead costs. However, the Board denied PJD Eichleay
unabsorbed home office overhead damages because PJD did not
7
prove it was on “standby.” The Board also ruled that a stipulation
entered by the parties addressed only Eichleay quantum and not
8
Eichleay entitlement. The Federal Circuit framed the unabsorbed
overhead issues by stating that “[t]he primary issues here are whether
the parties’ stipulation entitled PJD to recovery of home office
overhead and, if not, whether PJD had shown the [government]
9
placed it on standby.”
Rather than first addressing the stipulation, the court instead
10
addressed the standby issue. The court spent three pages clarifying
ten years of Federal Circuit precedent on the standby requirement
11
The analysis attempted to reconcile
for an Eichleay recovery.
inconsistent language in earlier decisions that supported the position
that suspension of work and idleness are not prerequisites for a
12
standby finding. Finding the standby inquiry multifaceted, the court
explained that the standby element is met if the contracting officer

Williams Constr., Inc. v. White, 326 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Nicon, Inc. v. United
States, 331 F.3d 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Charles G. Williams Constr., Inc. v. White, 271
F.3d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Sauer, Inc. v. Danzig, 224 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Melka Marine, Inc. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999); E.R. Mitchell
Constr. Co. v. Danzig, 175 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999); West v. All State Boiler, Inc.,
146 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Satellite Elec. Co. v. Dalton, 105 F.3d 1418 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Altmayer v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Mech-Con Corp. v. West,
61 F.3d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Wickham Contracting Co., Inc. v. Fischer, 12 F.3d 1574
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Interstate Gen. Gov’t Contractors, Inc. v. West, 12 F.3d 1053 (Fed.
Cir. 1993); Daly Constr., Inc. v. Garrett, 5 F.3d 520 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Cmty. Heating &
Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
4. 324 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
5. Id. at 1368.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1369 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 1370. The Federal Circuit ruled later in the opinion that a stipulation
between the parties regarding the damages calculations rendered unnecessary any
proof of entitlement to Eichleay damages by the contractor. Id. at 1374.
11. Id. at 1371-73.
12. Id. at 1371-72.
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has issued a written order: (1) suspending all work on the contract
for an uncertain duration, and (2) requiring the contractor to
13
Because many
resume work immediately or on short notice.
suspension orders likely will not state that the contractor must
resume work immediately or on short notice, the Federal Circuit’s
discussion of how to prove standby status with indirect evidence will
14
likely generate more “Eichleay” litigation in the future.
Absent written orders containing the explicit directive referenced
above, the Federal Circuit further explained that the contractor must
prove standby with indirect evidence, including evidence that:
(1) the substantial government-caused delay was of an indefinite
duration; (2) during the delay the contractor had to be prepared to
resume work immediately and at full speed; and (3) the contractor
15
effectively suspended most or all of the contract work. Noting that
case law has not addressed the second element of the standby test in
16
detail, the court’s discussion of this element in the context of
(a) calculating a reasonable amount of time to remobilize,
(b) remobilizing with a reduced work force, and (c) keeping some
17
equipment and men at the work site will invite further disputes
between contractors and the government.
It is difficult to understand why proof for an Eichleay claim should
include the requirement that a contractor on standby must be
prepared to resume work immediately and at full speed. If a
suspension order tells a contractor to anticipate resuming work in
three months, that advance notice does not make it any easier for the
contractor to find replacement revenue for that three month period
to absorb its project management personnel and bonding capacity
than if no such notice was provided. A contractor will not find a new
job for its management staff to replace the loss of revenue caused by
the suspension simply because it knows that the suspension will end
three months later. With or without notice that the suspended work
will resume in three months, the contractor suffers the same loss of
revenue stream to absorb overhead. If a contractor is told that the
suspension will end two years later, this requirement may be
reasonable because the contractor may have an opportunity to find
substitute work. It is unreasonable if the contractor’s bonding
13. Id. at 1371.
14. See Nash & Cibinic, Rampant Confusion, supra note 2, ¶ 23 (proposing two
ways to simplify the calculation of damages and satisfying the standby requirement,
which limit the amount of complex litigation).
15. P.J. Dick Inc., 324 F.3d at 1371.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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capacity is tied up during the two year work period by the suspended
work. Thus, the court imposed another rigid requirement without
regard to how the facts of a particular case should govern the award
of damages.
Concerning the third element of the standby test, partial
suspensions are more likely than total suspensions of work. In
addition, a total suspension of a subcontractor’s work is more likely
than a total suspension of the general prime contract. Thus, the
court’s discussion of whether the continued performance involved
18
“only insubstantial work on the contract” will likely face further
litigation under this element of the standby test. The standby rule
has nothing to do with the economics or accounting of unabsorbed
19
overhead, and the standby requirements in P.J. Dick further
complicate the analysis, likely engendering further litigation.
Whether these new requirements sound the “death knell” of
20
Eichleay, they certainly make it much more difficult to recover
Eichleay damages.
The Federal Circuit imposed a relatively simple, logical limitation
of Eichleay in C.B.C. Enterprises by finding that Eichleay should not be
21
applied automatically to all delays. The court ruled that Eichleay
should only apply when the government suspends, disrupts, or delays
22
a contract in a manner that imposes uncertainty on the contractor.
Although the Eichleay formula is intended to simplify the calculation
23
of overhead costs, the Federal Circuit’s requirements in P.J. Dick
have not simplified the process:
In short, a court evaluating a contractor’s claim for Eichleay
damages should ask the following questions: (1) was there a
government-caused delay that was not concurrent with another
delay caused by some other source; (2) did the contractor
demonstrate that it incurred additional overhead (i.e., was the
original time frame for completion extended or did the contractor
satisfy the Interstate three-part test); (3) did the government
18. Id. at 1372.
19. Nash & Cibinic, Rampant Confusion, supra note 2, ¶ 23.
20. Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Postscript: Unabsorbed Overhead and the
“Eichleay” Formula, 17 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶¶ 33, 87 (2003) (arguing that the P.J. Dick
Inc. decision severely diminishes the ability of contractors to recover unabsorbed
overhead under the standby rule).
21. C.B.C. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 978 F.2d 669, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
22. Id.
23. Nicon, Inc. v. United States, 331 F.3d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part); see also Nash & Cibinic, Rampant Confusion, supra note 2, ¶ 23
(contending that although the calculation of Eichleay damages is not complex,
recent court decisions and the standby requirement unnecessarily increase the
complexity of litigation).
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[contracting officer] issue a suspension or other order expressly
putting the contractor on standby; (4) if not, can the contractor
prove there was a delay of indefinite duration during which it could
not bill substantial amounts of work on the contract and at the end
of which it was required to be able to return to work on the
contract at full speed and immediately; (5) can the government
satisfy its burden of production showing that it was not impractical
for the contractor to take on replacement work (i.e., a new
contract) and thereby mitigate its damages; and (6) if the
government meets its burden of production, can the contractor
satisfy its burden of persuasion that it was impractical for it to
obtain sufficient replacement work. Only where the above exacting
requirements can be satisfied will a contractor be entitled to
24
Eichleay damages.

It is unlikely that a contractor could recover under these
requirements given the facts in the numerous cases cited with
approval in C.B.C. Enterprises where Eichleay damages were
25
recovered. The legal hurdles summarized in P.J. Dick are not linked
to the practical accounting proof established in C.B.C. Enterprises,
which required the contractor to prove that the government caused
delays of uncertain length and reduced the contractor’s flow of direct
cost stream of revenue. Rather than making questions (2)-(6) in the
P.J. Dick analysis legal requirements for recovery, they should serve as
factors to consider in determining whether the evidence satisfies the
two basic tests for entitlement under C.B.C. Enterprises: (1) did
government-caused delay of an uncertain duration cause a reduction
in the contractor’s stream of direct costs, and (2) did the contractor
mitigate or could have mitigated the unabsorbed overhead damages
caused by the delay.
The C.B.C. Enterprises test is whether government-caused delay
creates uncertainty which prevents the contractor from taking on
more work to generate additional direct cost revenue to replace and
24. P.J. Dick Inc., 324 F.3d at 1373 (emphasis in original).
25. “See, e.g., Weaver-Bailey Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 474, 477
(1990); A.A. Beiro Constr. Co., 91-3 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 24,149, ¶ 120,844 (ENGBCA
1991); Cieszko Constr. Co., 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 20,223, ¶ 102,417 (ASBCA 1987);
Shirley Contracting Corp., 85-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 17,858, ¶¶ 89,399-400 (ABCA 1984);
Excavation-Constr., Inc., 82-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 15,770, ¶¶ 78,067-68 (ENGBCA 1982);
Savoy Constr. Co., 85-2 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 18,073, ¶ 90,723 (ASBCA 1985). See also
Williams Enters., Inc. v. Sherman R. Smoot Co., 938 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In all
these cases when disruption, suspension or delay caused by the government has
reduced the stream of direct costs in a contract, it is appropriate to use the Eichleay
formula to calculate extended home office overhead instead of the fixed percentage
rate formula because the latter would not adequately compensate the contractor for
extended home office overhead.” C.B.C. Enters., Inc., 978 F.2d at 674 (internal
parentheticals eliminated).
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absorb the delayed contract’s share of home office overhead. The
practical proof normally should be whether the contractor’s bonding
capacity, or key contract management, or equipment is tied up by the
delayed contract preventing the contractor from replacing that
contract’s direct revenue stream with other work. The P.J. Dick
“standby” requirements unnecessarily undermine the logic and
rationale of C.B.C. Enterprises.
B. Charles G. Williams Construction, Inc. v. White
Twenty-five days after P.J. Dick, the Federal Circuit issued its
26
decision in Charles G. Williams Construction, Inc. v. White.
This
decision involved the second appeal of a contractor’s claim for
Eichleay damages. On the first appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated
the decision by the Armed Services Board of Contract, which denied
Williams’ Eichleay claim, and remanded for the Board to discuss the
two prerequisites a contractor must show to recover Eichleay
damages: (1) the contractor was on standby during the delay, and
27
(2) it was unable to take on other work during the delay.
On remand, the Board again denied the contractor’s Eichleay
claim, finding that Williams had not shown suspension or significant
interruption of work performance during the period of delay
28
involved.
The Board based its finding on a Defense Contract
Auditor Agency auditor’s report and credible testimony that Williams
29
could not show it had a reduction in the flow of direct costs. Rather,
the contract continued to absorb its equitable share of general and
30
administrative expenses.
The Federal Circuit rejected the
contractor’s assertion that Eichleay applies if government delay
causes inefficient performance as continued performance permits
31
the absorption of indirect costs.
C. Nicon, Inc. v. United States
A month after Charles G. Williams Construction, the Federal Circuit
32
issued Nicon, Inc. v. United States. In this case, the Army awarded
33
Nicon a construction contract on March 30, 1998. Subsequently, a
different bidder protested the award and the Army instructed Nicon
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

326 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1379-80.
Id. at 1378.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1380-81.
331 F.3d 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 881.
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34

35

to suspend all work. The protest was dismissed on July 15, 1988.
Despite Nicon’s requests to proceed with the contract, the Army did
not proceed with the contract and terminated it for convenience on
36
January 12, 1999. When Nicon submitted a termination settlement
proposal, the contracting officer paid direct costs plus mark up, but
denied a modified Eichleay claim for unabsorbed home office
37
38
overhead. Nicon filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”).
The CFC granted summary judgment for the government because
39
Wickham Contracting Co. v. Fischer did not permit the court to accept
40
a modified Eichleay formula.
The Federal Circuit vacated the CFC’s decision and remanded the
case to the CFC to determine whether there was government-caused
delay of uncertain duration and whether Nicon was on standby
41
during the period of delay. The Federal Circuit held that it could
not apply the Eichleay formula for the relief sought because, absent
42
any performance, it had no billings to apply in the formula.
However, if contract performance has not begun, the Federal Circuit
held the contractor may recover unabsorbed overhead costs in a
termination for convenience settlement “if a reasonable method of
allocation can be determined on the facts of the case and the
contractor can otherwise satisfy the strict prerequisites for recovery of
43
unabsorbed overhead costs.”
The concurring opinion by Judge Newman disagreed about the
inapplicability of Eichleay and suggested that a modified Eichleay
44
formula may be appropriate. Judge Newman’s concurring opinion
noted that:
The Eichleay formula is not a matter of legal entitlement; it is
simply a mathematical equation for allocation of unreimbursed
overhead costs. It is incorrect to promote it to a substantive
entitlement limited to an inflexible formula . . . . If the formula
does not precisely fit the circumstances, this does not warrant
either dismissal of the claim or determination that the Eichleay
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 882.
38. Id.
39. 12 F.3d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
40. Nicon, Inc., 331 F.3d at 887-88.
41. Id. at 887.
42. Id. at 884-85.
43. Id. at 888.
44. Id. at 889 (Newman, J., concurring in part) (observing that the court had
previously recognized the potential application of close variations of the Eichleay
formula).
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formula is inapplicable; rather, it warrants adaptation, if such is
45
needed, to the situation as it existed.

Elevating the Eichleay formula to a substantive entitlement limited
to an inflexible formula is precisely what the Federal Circuit did in
Wickham Contracting Co., Inc. v. Fischer and its progeny by insisting
Eichleay is the only permissible calculation for determining claims of
46
unabsorbed overhead.
In Wickham Contracting Co., the Federal
Circuit cited no empirical data to support its conclusion that Eichleay
is the only means to fairly measure unabsorbed overhead. Although it
is an equitable method, that does not mean it is the only method.
Eichleay was devised to apply to construction contracts. It is not
necessarily the appropriate measure for disruptions to a
manufacturer’s shop overhead or to other non-construction
businesses. There are other methods available for evaluating
47
unabsorbed overhead claims. Whether they should be utilized or
not should depend upon the facts of each case. However, by judicial
fiat, the Federal Circuit declared that a contractor cannot use any
other means to prove unabsorbed overhead damages, without any
industry-accepted support that only the Eichleay formula can
measure such damages in all cases.
Reasonably limiting the
application of Eichleay is one thing. Precluding contractors from
proving unabsorbed overhead damages by any other reasonable
means is quite another.
The trial court in Nicon had no option but to reject the contractor’s
unabsorbed overhead claims because Federal Circuit Eichleay
jurisprudence prohibited the trial court from fairly addressing the
48
contractor’s claims through other methods of calculating damages.
Fortunately, the Federal Circuit’s majority opinion allows some
allocation method other than Eichleay in a very limited situation, i.e.,
49
where no work has been performed. Judge Newman’s concurring
45. Id. at 889-90.
46. Wickham Contracting Co., Inc. v. Fischer, 12 F.3d 1574, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (finding that the Eichleay formula provided an equitable means of calculating
unabsorbed overhead damages without imposing additional costs on taxpayers and
promoting its exclusive use where the Eichleay prerequisites are met).
47. See Patrick A. McGeehin, Learning from Eichleay: Unabsorbed Overhead Claims in
State and Local Jurisdictions, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 351, 358-59 (1996) (providing
examples of alternate approaches to calculating unabsorbed overhead claims).
48. See Nash & Cibinic, supra note 20, at 87 (arguing that courts should abandon
the Eichleay formula and the stringent standby rule, which severely limits a
contractor’s ability to recover unabsorbed overhead, and gives contractors the
burden of proof, but noting that Federal Circuit precedent prevents this approach).
49. See Nicon, Inc., 331 F.3d at 888 (holding that in situations where contract
performance has not yet begun, the contractor may recover unabsorbed overhead
costs if a reasonable method of allocation may be determined on the facts of the
case).
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opinion in Nicon correctly argues that Eichleay should be a method of
50
allocation—not a rule of law. In any event, the opinions in Nicon
provide a glimmer of hope that the Federal Circuit will eventually
recognize that contractors should be allowed to prove their
unabsorbed overhead damages claims by any evidence or formula
which fairly measures the home office damage caused by government
delays.
II. DAMAGES—MODIFIED TOTAL COST METHOD
51

Propellex Corp. v. Brownlee involved two fixed-price supply contracts
52
for primers, a component of gun shells containing black powder.
The contracts required submission of samples of primers to test the
53
moisture content of the black powder, and the Army subsequently
determined that the moisture content of the primers was too high
54
and rejected many primers. During the following two years, the
contractor conducted an investigation to determine the cause of the
moisture and found no evidence that the moisture content exceeded
55
the specified level.
During this two-year period, the contractor
continued primer production, the government rejected three
additional lots, and the contractor diverted production employees to
56
investigate the moisture problem.
Subsequently, an observation team found defects in the
government’s testing procedure for the fifth lot of primers, and the
57
Army eventually accepted all the primers produced by Propellex.
Propellex filed a claim for equitable adjustment for $1.8 million
using the modified total cost method for the costs it incurred by
conducting the moisture investigation, as well as costs incurred by
58
testing the moisture content of the primers prior to this delivery.
Although the contractor kept test records during the two-year
investigative period, the records did not track the hours or materials
59
spent investigating the moisture issue raised by the Army.
The
contracting officer agreed that the Army erroneously tested the
50. Id. at 889 (Newman, J., concurring in part) (arguing that courts should be
more flexible when determining whether the application of the Eichleay formula is
appropriate).
51. 342 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
52. Id. at 1336.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1337.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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samples, awarded $77,325, and denied the balance of the claim based
upon insufficient support for the additional costs claimed by
60
Propellex appealed to the Armed Services Board of
Propellex.
Contract Appeals, which awarded claim preparation and consulting
expenses, but denied the balance of Propellex’s claim for the
moisture investigation for lack of proof of its modified total cost
61
claim.
While the contractor adjusted its claim by deducting
amounts for bid errors and costs for which it admitted responsibility,
the Board found that Propellex failed to establish two of the four
requirements for the total cost method, i.e., the impracticability of
directly proving its actual losses, and Propellex’s lack of responsibility
62
for the added costs.
The contractor appealed the Board’s reasoning that it failed to
63
prove all the prongs of the total cost method. Since the Federal
Circuit concluded that the Board correctly denied the claim for
failure to show the impracticability of proving its actual losses directly,
it did not address whether the contractor failed to prove lack of
64
65
responsibility for the added costs. The Federal Circuit affirmed,
thereby creating a decision which will make it more difficult for
contractors to use the modified total cost or total cost methods to
prove damages successfully.
In its decision, the Federal Circuit agreed that substantial evidence
supported the Board’s finding that Propellex failed to establish the
66
impracticability of proving its actual costs directly.
While the
contractor could have set up a cost code to segregate the costs of its
67
moisture investigation, it did not do so.
Instead, the contractor
believed itself responsible for the moisture problem, a belief which in
the Federal Circuit’s opinion made segregation of investigation costs
from costs incurred under the Army’s contracts all the more
68
important. The court stated that whether the contracts were fixed
price was not important because “where a contractor can capture its
60. Id. at 1337-38.
61. Id. at 1338.
62. Id. The four elements are: (1) the impracticability of proving its actual losses
directly; (2) the reasonableness of its bid; (3) the reasonableness of its actual costs;
and (4) lack of responsibility for the added costs. Id.
63. Id. at 1340.
64. Id. But see supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that in P.J. Dick Inc.,
the Federal Circuit addressed the standby issue for Eichleay proof, even though the
court’s finding that the contractor did not need to prove legal entitlement to
Eichleay damages rendered the standby discussion unnecessary).
65. Propellex Corp., 342 F.3d at 1340.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1342.
68. Id.
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increased costs . . . it should do so regardless of whether its contract is
a fixed price contract. This is good business practice, and fosters
69
accountable and efficient contract performance.”
This reasoning is troublesome for several reasons. There seems to
be little logical basis to conclude that a fixed-price contractor should
70
segregate costs relating to self-imposed problems. The contractor
was entitled to be paid for supplies delivered—not for costs incurred.
Whether the contract is a fixed-price contract or a costreimbursement contract makes all the difference in determining how
to account for costs during performance. Fixed-price contractors
have fewer overhead accounting costs because they spend less time
tracking and documenting costs than cost-reimbursement
contractors. There are good reasons for the significant differences in
how fixed-priced contractors and cost-reimbursement contractors
track costs.
In dismissing the fixed-price contract argument, the Federal
Circuit observed the “good business practice” inherent in segregating
increased costs for problems that the contractor believes itself
71
responsible, even under a fixed-price contract. The Federal Circuit
cited no evidence to support that conclusion. The Federal Circuit
also stated that regardless of whether it is a fixed-price contract,
segregating costs for contractor problems on fixed-price contracts
72
“fosters accountable and efficient contract performance.”
If the
Federal Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”), the contract, or general
accounting principles do not require fixed-price contractors to
segregate increased costs due to contractor-caused problems, it is
difficult to understand why the Federal Circuit should impose such
accounting practices. It is one thing to penalize a contractor for
failing to track increased costs due to government-caused problems
when the contractor has reason and it is normal practice to do so. It
is another to penalize a contractor for failing to separately track costs
under a fixed-price contract when it does not believe the government
is responsible for them.
The contractor also argued that the Board improperly cited the
contractor’s ability to satisfy the fourth element of the total cost test
as proof that it was practicable to satisfy the first element of the test,
73
i.e., to estimate costs for the government-caused problems.
The
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1342 n.3.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1342 n.3.
Id.
Id. at 1343.
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contractor argued that the Board’s logic essentially did away with a
contractor’s ability to recover under a modified total cost approach,
as the contractor’s deduction for non-government-caused problems
will always be cited as proof that it could segregate costs for
74
government-caused problems.
In rejecting this argument, the
Federal Circuit reasoned as a matter of law that a contractor will still
be able to establish that its ability to segregate some costs does not
automatically disprove the impracticability of proving the contractor’s
75
losses directly. The problem with this legal conclusion is that, as a
factual matter, the evidence cited to support the Board’s conclusion
that the contractor could estimate costs for the government-caused
moisture problem was the estimation and deduction of contractorcaused extra costs by the contractor’s expert in the modified total
76
cost claim. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit found that the Board
correctly relied on Propellex’s calculations of costs unrelated to the
moisture problem as evidence that it was not impracticable for
77
Propellex to prove its losses directly. It is not clear how a contractor
will be able to meet the first element of the test if the Board or court
may factually defeat that element by pointing to the contractor’s
ability to deduct contractor-caused costs. Although a contractor can
estimate and segregate contractor-caused extra costs, it does not
necessarily mean it can do the same for government-caused extra
costs. This reasoning will only encourage the government to reject
modified total costs claims whenever contractors do the right thing
and deduct contractor-caused extra costs from the total cost claim.
Propellex also argued that Servidone Construction Corp. v. United
78
States supported Propellex’s claim since the volume of work in
Propellex’s contract (number of primers supplied) did not increase,
just as the volume of dirt to be excavated in Servidone Construction
79
Corp. did not increase.
In both cases, the “extra work” claims
produced the same volume of work required under the contract. In
rejecting this argument, the Federal Circuit reasoned that in Servidone
Construction Corp., there was no way for the contractor to segregate its
80
extra costs, while Propellex could have tracked its extra costs.

74. Id. at 1340.
75. Id. at 1343.
76. Id. at 1342 n.4.
77. Id. at 1343.
78. 931 F.2d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
79. Propellex Corp., 342 F.3d at 1343. See Servidone Constr. Corp., 931 F.2d at 862
(granting the contractor recovery under a modified total cost method).
80. Propellex Corp., 342 F.3d at 1343-44.
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The Propellex decision will encourage further litigation over
modified total cost claims. The mere fact that a contractor deducts
contractor-caused extra costs from its modified total cost claim
should not be sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that it
could have segregated the government-caused extra costs. Nor
should the Federal Circuit attempt to establish standards for proper
accounting practices for contractors that are not reflected in FAR,
general accounting principles, or the contract in question.
III. DAMAGES—LOST PROFITS
81

In Rumsfeld v. Applied Companies, Inc., the Defense Logistic Agency
(“DLA”) breached its requirements contract with Applied
Companies, Inc. (“Applied”). DLA issued a request for proposals
(“RFP”) to provide, among other things, cylinders to store
82
refrigerants.
The RFP estimated the DLA’s requirements to be
120,000 cylinders of refrigerants during the term of the one-year
83
contract. Prior to contract award, DLA determined that it would
84
need only one-tenth of the estimated quantity. However, DLA did
not notify the offerors of this change, and the notice of award to
85
Applied included the estimate contained in the RFP. DLA did not
inform Applied of the faulty estimate until one month into contract
86
performance. DLA eventually ordered a total of 11,950 cylinders
87
and sought to modify the contract to a new contract price. When
Applied declined to supply at the government’s price, the
88
government terminated the contract for convenience. None of the
89
quantities were delivered. The contracting officer denied Applied’s
claim for breach of contract and determined that DLA’s failure to
exercise due care in preparation of its estimates gave rise to a
constructive change entitling Applied only to an equitable
90
adjustment. Applied appealed to the Board, which held that the
DLA’s actions constituted a breach of contract that entitled Applied
to compensatory damages and noted in passing that while its decision
only addressed entitlement to breach, the contractor’s damages may

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

325 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1331.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1332.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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91

include anticipated profits. In a decision issued on December 10,
2002, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s entitlement decision,
finding that negligently prepared estimates may form the basis for a
92
claim of breach of a requirements contract. On April 2, 2003, the
Federal Circuit granted a Petition for Rehearing to correct factual
misstatements in its previous decision, withdrew that opinion, and
93
substituted a corrected opinion. The new opinion contained no
substantive changes from the prior opinion.
While the Board did not reach a decision on quantum, the Federal
Circuit decided to provide guidance on the lost profits claim, given
94
the Board’s passing comments on that issue. This case represented
a first impression issue of whether lost profits under a requirements
contract are recoverable on negligently prepared estimates, where
none of the requirements were diverted to a third party. Prior
decisions addressing lost profits for breaches of requirements
95
contracts involved diversion of requirements to third parties and
approaching such awards in this manner provided the proof needed
to meet the requirements of lost profits set forth in California Federal
96
Bank v. United States.
The Federal Circuit in Applied Companies
concluded that an award of lost profits for all of the estimated
120,000 cylinders would convert the contract from a requirements
contract, where the government only orders its actual needs, to a
97
guaranteed quantity contract. In addition, the Federal Circuit held
that in this case the contractor could not establish that it would have
made a profit had DLA issued proper estimates or told bidders that
98
its estimates were inaccurate.
The Federal Circuit also concluded that lost profits in this case
would allow the contractor to profit from DLA’s breach, because the
91. Id. at 1333, 1335.
92. Rumsfeld v. Applied Cos., Inc., 318 F.3d 1317, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
93. Applied Cos., Inc., 325 F.3d at 1329-30.
94. Id. at 1335.
95. See Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. v. Barram, 226 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (reaffirming the availability of lost profits compensation when the government
procures goods or services from a third party, thereby breaching a requirements
contract); Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 771 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (asserting that
under a requirements contract, the termination for convenience clause does not
permit the government to breach its only meaningful obligation by diverting
business away from a contractor); Locke v. United States, 283 F.2d 521, 523 (Ct. Cl.
1960) (holding that the claimant was entitled to compensation for its projected share
of business stemming from a breached requirements contract).
96. 245 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (requiring a definite determination that the
contractor would have made a profit, the amount of which may be reasonably
estimated, and a showing that the lost profits were the proximate result of the
breach).
97. Applied Cos., Inc., 325 F.3d at 1339.
98. Id. at 1340.
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contractor would have earned a profit on the cylinders sold, or it
would not have bid at all if the government had provided a
99
To allow recovery on the full 120,000
reasonable estimate.
estimated quantity would place the contractor in a better position
than if the DLA had never breached the contract by negligently
100
providing the estimates. Thus, the contractor’s recovery is limited
101
to an equitable adjustment in price of units delivered, or it is
limited to a recovery for termination for convenience costs if the
102
contractor did not deliver any cylinders.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Dyk presented a classic “Contracts
101” debate over the standard of proof for an award of lost profits.
Judge Dyk noted that in none of the negligent misrepresentation
103
precedents cited by the majority did the contractor seek lost profits.
Citing the general law of contracts allowing lost profits based on the
amounts of likely purchases, the dissent was particularly disturbed by
the majority’s failure to provide the contractor an opportunity to
104
prove foreseeability of likely purchases. The dissent argued that the
majority decision will effectively permit the government to
misrepresent its requirements without consequences in situations
where the misrepresentation does not cause the contractor an
105
increase in costs.
IV. DEFAULT
Several important decisions were issued in 2003, which defined
standards of review to be utilized in reviewing the propriety of
terminations for default.
A. McDonnell Douglas v. United States
106

In McDonnell Douglas v. United States, the Federal Circuit issued its
second opinion in the twelve years of litigation for this termination
107
108
for default dispute. The first Federal Circuit opinion reversed the
Court of Federal Claim’s (“CFC”) ruling that the Navy did not base its
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1341.
102. Id. at 1342.
103. Id. at 1342-45 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. Id. at 1345.
105. Id.
106. 323 F.3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
107. See id. at 1010 (noting that this case arose in 1991 when the government
defaulted on a contract with McDonnell Douglas for the development of a carrierbased stealth aircraft).
108. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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109

decision to terminate on the contractor’s performance.
The CFC
110
which barred default
misapplied Schlesinger v. United States,
termination only where the termination had no connection to the
111
contractor’s performance.
Since the termination in this case
related to the contractor’s performance, the Federal Circuit ordered
112
a remand to determine if the contractor was in default.
On the first remand, the CFC sustained the trial court’s finding of
default termination solely on the contractor’s failure to meet
113
performance deadlines. The trial court improperly interpreted the
Federal Circuit’s first decision as requiring the trial court to sustain
114
the default as long as the delivery date was reasonable. The Federal
Circuit rejected both parties’ plea to rule on the default termination
and end the litigation on appeal, because the CFC record did not
contain adequate factual findings to establish whether the contractor
115
was in default. This second opinion provides guidance for applying
116
the standard in Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States for reviewing
default termination.
The Federal Circuit rejected the contractor’s position that the
standard FAR default language, which permits default termination if
the contractor “fails to . . . [p]rosecute the work so as to endanger
117
performance of this contract,” allows for default termination only
for absolute impossibility of performance or complete repudiation or
118
abandonment by the contractor.
Nor did the Federal Circuit
accept the government’s position that prior default precedents did
not apply, and that default termination is appropriate when a
contractor expresses a concern that it may not be able to comply with
119
a schedule milestone or specification requirements.
The Federal
109. Id. at 1326-27.
110. 390 F.2d 702 (1968) (finding that the government’s failure to provide
constructive notice under a contract’s default termination provision rendered the
government’s termination one of convenience, even though the termination
occurred after the supplier failed to perform adequately under the contract).
111. McDonnell Douglas, 323 F.3d at 1013.
112. McDonnell Douglas, 182 F.3d at 1329.
113. McDonnell Douglas, 323 F.3d at 1011 (reiterating the CFC’s refusal to base its
determination of justified default on the contractor’s alleged inability to perform the
contact, anticipatory repudiation, or failure to comply with specific requirements).
114. See id. at 1012-13 (recalling that in its remand order, the Federal Circuit
required the CFC to determine whether the government established default by the
contractor, in which case the validity of the default termination should be upheld
and the contractors would not recover under a convenience termination claim).
115. Id. at 1014.
116. 828 F.2d 759 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See infra note 121 and accompanying text for
discussion of the Lisbon Contractors, Inc. standard.
117. 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-9(a)(1)(ii) (1984).
118. McDonnell Douglas, 323 F.3d at 1014-15.
119. Id. at 1015.
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Circuit held that interpretation of the FAR default provision requires
a compromise between judicial aversion to default terminations and
120
It
the government’s right to performance under the contract.
reaffirmed the “pragmatic approach” adopted in Lisbon Contractors,
Inc., which requires the government to establish a reasonable belief
that the contractor could not complete contract performance, with
any reasonable likelihood, within the time remaining under the
121
contract. A showing that the contractor fell behind schedule does
122
There should be tangible,
not satisfy the government’s burden.
direct evidence showing objective factors to make this determination,
such as: testimony from the contracting officer; contemporaneous
documents; a comparison of percentage of unfinished work to time
left under the contract; a showing that the contractor failed to meet
project milestones; and any relevant information about the
123
contractor’s financial position and performance history.
In language which will often be quoted for what the government
does not need to prove, the Federal Circuit held that the contracting
124
officer does not have to prove he was in fact correct. The standard
is whether the contracting officer was “justifiably insecure about the
125
contract’s timely completion.” In doing so, the focus is on whether
the contracting officer had a reasonable belief based upon facts
leading up to the time of the default decision—not whether the
126
decision was correct based on hindsight and post-termination facts.
The Federal Circuit remanded for a determination of whether the
government proved that the contracting officer reasonably believed
that there was no reasonable likelihood that the contractor could
127
complete contract performance within the allotted time.
The Federal Circuit also ruled that the CFC correctly found the
government’s unilateral imposition of a revised schedule to be
reasonable based upon the methodical, comprehensive inquiry
conducted by the Navy, taking into account all the issues and
128
information available.
This finding does not require an
examination of the amount of unfinished work as of the date of issue
of the unilateral schedule, or an analysis of how long it would take
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1015-16.
122. Id. at 1016.
123. Id. at 1016-17.
124. Id. at 1017.
125. Id. at 1017 (citing Discount Co. v. United States, 554 F.2d 435, 441 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1018.
128. Id. at 1019.
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the contractor to complete the work given its capacity.
Although
useful, such inquiries are not required to meet a reasonableness
130
131
determination under DeVito v. United States.
The Federal Circuit rejected an “objective achievability” analysis
since it would require a departure from the case law, and “would
compel the government to have perfect prescience and be infallible
132
in its decision.”
Since the government conducted a methodical
inquiry before imposing the new schedule on the contractor and
“[took] into account all the issues and information then available to
him,” including performance problems and the contractor’s track
record and progress, the CFC properly found the revised date to be
133
reasonable. Respected commentators contend that this decision is
a significant departure from the case law because the trial court does
134
not have to make an independent analysis of the facts. Rather, the
new rule is whether the revised date is subjectively reasonable in the
government’s view.
The Federal Circuit’s reluctance to impose an “objective
achievability” analysis on a unique major weapons contract is
understandable given the lack of prior experience producing the
deliverables. However, the vast majority of default terminations
involve more mundane construction and supply contracts where
reliable, comparable contractor and industry performance
experiences exist for an objective analysis of whether a revised
schedule is reasonable or not. Judges in future litigation over the
more typical default terminations involving unilateral revised
schedules will have to decide whether such objective data should have
been considered by the contracting officer in unilaterally establishing
a revised schedule.
Thus, the court imposed, both for the default termination decision
and for the unilateral imposition of a revised schedule decision, that

129. Id. (stating that such a finding is based on what the government knew or
should have known at the time it adopted the unilateral schedule).
130. Id.
131. 413 F.2d 1147, 1154 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (stating that where the government
unilaterally sets a new date for performance, such date must be “both reasonable and
specific from the standpoint of the performance capabilities of the contractor at the
time notice is given.”).
132. McDonnell Douglas, 323 F.3d at 1019.
133. Id.
134. See Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Postscript II: The “A-12” Default Termination,
17 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 38, at 74 (2003) (observing that judges in the past have
conducted an independent assessment of the facts when determining whether a new
date, independently imposed by the government, is objectively reasonable based on
the contractor’s capabilities and what the government knew or should have known).
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the standard of review should be based on whether the contracting
officer reasonably utilized objective data to reach those decisions.
The Federal Circuit also agreed that the contractor’s superior
knowledge defense to the default should be dismissed, because it
required discovery of information protected by the Military and
135
States Secrets privilege, which the government properly invoked.
Similarly, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause argument raised
136
by the contractors was rejected based on the Supreme Court’s
137
findings in United States v. Reynolds.
B. Johnson v. All-State Construction
138

In Johnson v. All-State Construction, the Navy appealed the decision
of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals that the Navy
breached its contract with All-State Construction by withholding
139
progress payments to offset liquidated damages.
In granting
summary judgment on the contractor’s breach of contract claim, the
Board held that FAR 52.232-5(d) limited the amount of progress
payments that the government could retain to a maximum of ten
140
percent of the payment amount. As such, the Board found that the
Navy’s retention of thirty-eight percent of All-State’s progress
payments breached the contract, and the Board converted the
141
default termination to one for convenience.
The Federal Circuit held that, absent a contract clause permitting
the government to retain progress payments in anticipation of default
termination, the Navy may not retain payments over and above the
142
ten percent retainage right under FAR 52.232-5(d).
However, the
government may exercise its common law right of set-off to retain
143
payments to cover the liquidated damages due the government.
135. McDonnell Douglas, 323 F.3d at 1020-21 (noting that the Military and States
Secrets privilege can preclude discovery of information that might adversely affect
national security).
136. Id. at 1023 (rejecting the contractor’s argument that the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause trumps the Military and State Secrets privilege and requires the
government either to disclose the classified information or to forego the default
termination action).
137. 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (finding that in a civil matter, the government’s invocation
of a privilege does not disadvantage the opposing party in the same way that such a
privilege deprives a criminal defendant of information necessary to his defense,
especially since the government was also responsible for raising the criminal charges
in the first place).
138. 329 F.3d 848 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
139. Id. at 850.
140. Id. at 851.
141. Id. at 851.
142. Id. at 851-52.
143. Id. at 852.
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This right of set-off is not limited by the retainage clause, FAR 52.2325(d), or the set-off clause in the contract, because the contract
provisions do not contain specific language defeating the
144
government’s right to set-off.
Reciting the set-off requirements of
145
Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, the Federal Circuit held that
the government properly exercised its right to set-off by taking the
following steps: “(i) a decision to effectuate a setoff, (ii) some action
146
accomplishing the setoff, and (iii) a recording of the setoff.”
Finally, the court found that the Navy may demand liquidated
damages pursuant to set-off rights prior to making a final decision to
terminate the contract even though the contractor is still performing
147
under the contract.
C. Copeland v. Secretary of Agriculture
148

In Copeland v. Secretary of Agriculture, the contractor’s employees
reported $37,905 in Davis Bacon Act (“DBA”) violations to the Forest
149
Service’s contracting officer. The contracting officer withheld and
delayed payment of progress payments based on the possible DBA
150
Copeland’s performance was delayed and the
violations.
151
government eventually terminated both contracts for default.
Copeland appealed to the Board of Contract Appeals, which
dismissed the appeal based on a pending decision of Copeland’s DBA
violations by a Department of Labor (“DOL”) administrative law
152
judge (“ALJ”). Five years after Copeland’s default terminations, the
ALJ dismissed the DBA charges based on the DOL’s original delay in
153
prosecuting the violations. The government appealed, and the ALJ
held that Copeland violated the DBA in the amount of $3,951, but
154
dismissed the charges based on the DOL’s administrative delay.
Subsequently, Copeland appealed the default terminations to the
Board. The Board held that absent a showing that the Forest Service
inappropriately withheld payments, Copeland did not demonstrate
155
cause for altering the Forest Service’s default termination.
144. Id. at 853-54.
145. 516 U.S. 16, 19 (1995).
146. Johnson, 329 F.3d at 854.
147. Id. at 855.
148. 350 F.3d 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
149. Id. at 1231.
150. Id. at 1231-32.
151. Id. at 1232.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1232-33 (citing Bill Copeland, AGBCA Nos. 1999-182-1 to -187-1, 2000147-1 to -148-1, 02-2 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶¶ 32,049, 158,404 (2002)).
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Copeland contended that its performance on the contracts was
delayed based on the government’s excessive withholding of progress
156
The Federal Circuit ruled that a different standard is
payments.
157
applied to DBA withholdings than withholdings for set-offs. While
set-off withholdings are only proper if the set-off amount is properly
calculated, DBA withholdings are “proper as long as the amount
withheld depended on a reasonable judgment of the contracting
officer that the withheld amounts were needed to protect the
158
Notwithstanding the long delay in DOL
employees’ interests.”
proceedings, the burden remained on the contractor to prove that its
delay in performance due to the improper DBA withholdings was
excusable, largely because the contractor had “ample opportunity” to
159
prove the DBA violations false or owed in a lesser amount.
The
Federal Circuit noted that given the extraordinary delay in the DOL
decision-making process, if the contractor could have asked the
contracting officer to release the funds with documentation to
support his position that proper withholdings were made, the result
160
of this case would have been different.
V. COSTS
The Federal Circuit issued two significant cost decisions in 2003
interpreting (1) the interplay between FAR and cost accounting
standards principles on asset write-up allowability, and (2) the
recovery of defense legal costs under FAR.
A. Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corp. v. Secretary of Defense
161

In Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corp. v. Secretary of Defense, the
contractor submitted progress payment requests to the Navy, which
included costs attributable to an increase in valuation of its assets
162
during another company’s purchase of Kearfott.
The Navy
contended the amounts attributable to the asset write-up were not
163
allowable.
Kearfott appealed to the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals, which held that FAR 31.205-52 barred Kearfott
from recovering its costs associated with the increased asset
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1234.
Id.
Id. at 1234-35.
Id. at 1235.
320 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1371-72.
Id. at 1372.
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valuation.
The Board held that the FAR language applied to
Kearfott’s business combination and did not conflict with Cost
Accounting Standards (“CAS”), because the FAR language governed
165
allowability and not allocability.
The Federal Circuit upheld the Board’s decision and determined
that FAR 31.205-52 is an allowability provision and does not conflict
166
with CAS allocability principles. Kearfott argued that the 1990 FAR
regulation did not apply retroactively to a 1988 business
167
The Federal Circuit disagreed with Kearfott’s
transaction.
retroactivity rationale and held that the critical date for determining
168
the regulation’s applicability is the cost claim’s submission date.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit held that Kearfott’s interpretation
would create an “anomalous and cumbersome two-tiered system of
169
cost accounting.”
The asset write-up limitations would govern
businesses that combined after the 1990 FAR Regulation while
excluding earlier business combinations, even if the government
170
contract in such earlier instances was executed after 1990.
Thus,
the FAR regulation covers business combinations prior to 1990. The
Federal Circuit also reasoned that the application of FAR 31.205-52
did not affect Kearfott’s vested rights, and therefore, created no
171
retroactivity problem.
Kearfott also contended that the application of the FAR regulation
to the business combination causes the FAR regulation to conflict
172
with CAS 404 and 409.
The Federal Circuit rejected Kearfott’s
interpretation because it would lead to the invalidation of the FAR
regulation pre-1995 when the CAS provisions were modified to
173
comport with the FAR regulation.
Kearfott argued that the FAR
regulation operates as an allocability rule and where FAR and CAS
174
conflict regarding allocability, CAS governs.
The government
contended that the FAR regulation operates like a Defense
Acquisition Regulation provision which requires that general and
administrative expenses be allocated to individual costs in the G&A

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1374-75.
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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base and which was held to be an allowability provision. Thus, the
Federal Circuit determined that the success of Kearfott’s argument
rested on whether the FAR regulation is an allocability or allowability
176
regulation.
It determined that the FAR regulation was an
allowability regulation and held that:
Nothing in FAR 31.205-52 precludes contractors from measuring
and allocating their costs pursuant to the protocol set forth in the
pertinent CAS provisions. The FAR provision therefore has no
impact on the measurement and assignment of costs under CAS to
a contractor’s commercial contracts. Rather, the FAR provision
merely operates as an after-the-fact ceiling on the extent to which
certain costs will be allowed once they have been allocated among
177
the acquired asset values under the CAS provisions.

Relying on the administrative history of the FAR regulation, the
Federal Circuit held that the FAR functioned as an allowability rule,
178
which did not conflict with CAS.
Therefore, Kearfott’s costs for
179
asset write-ups were not recoverable.
B. Brownlee v. DynCorp
180

In Brownlee v. DynCorp, the contractor, DynCorp, won a cost-plus181
Soon
award-fee contract for base support services from the Army.
thereafter, the government began to investigate criminal allegations
against DynCorp, including recording of false data, fraudulent
182
documentation, and fraudulent use of government credit cards.
DynCorp expended legal fees to defend itself and its employees,
183
which concluded in a plea agreement by its branch manager.
DynCorp submitted a claim to the government for its defense costs,
which excluded those costs specifically expended in defending the
184
branch manager. The government denied DynCorp’s claim, and it
185
The
appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.
Board accepted the government’s argument that, pursuant to FAR
31.205-47(b), a contractor could not recover defense costs when a
proceeding resulted in the conviction of an agent or employee of the
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 1376.
See id. at 1375-76.
Id. at 1377.
Id.
Id.
349 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1346.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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186

contractor but not the contractor itself. However, the Board found
187
the regulation was inconsistent with the Major Fraud Act of 1988,
188
Therefore, the
which makes contractor costs allowable in part.
189
regulation was a “nullity.”
The Board remanded the case to
190
determine quantum in DynCorp’s favor.
In defending the Board’s decision, DynCorp contended that
(1) the FAR provision should not apply when only the employee, not
the contractor, is convicted, and (2) if the Federal Circuit construes
the FAR provision to disallow recovery of defense costs associated
with employee convictions, the regulation is invalid in light of the
Major Fraud Act of 1988, which makes “contractor” costs allowable in
191
part. The Federal Circuit rejected DynCorp’s interpretation of the
regulation and held that FAR 31.205-47(b) defines the term
192
“contractor” to include both the contractor and its employees.
Thus, the FAR regulation disallows not only the cost of defending the
employee, but all costs of the proceeding, including the cost of
defending the contractor, even though the contractor itself was not
193
convicted.
In addressing the contractor’s second argument, the Federal
Circuit found that the Major Fraud Act was ambiguous, and that
legislative history did not resolve the ambiguity in favor of the
194
contractor’s interpretation.
Turning to the analysis under Chevron
195
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the court found
that the FAR regulations should be afforded deference under Chevron
and concluded that FAR 31.205-47(b) specifically, given its
reasonable interpretation, was entitled to the same deference and was
196
binding. Even if the statutory term “contractor” could be construed
to exclude employees, the Federal Circuit held the Secretary of
Defense was authorized to adopt supplemental cost disallowance
rules going beyond the statute to include the contractor’s agents or
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See 10 U.S.C. § 2324 (2004) (explaining circumstances under which
contractors may recover costs).
189. Brownlee, 349 F.3d at 1346.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1352.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1352-53.
195. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that a review of an agency’s statutory
interpretation requires an analysis of whether the precise question has been directly
addressed by Congress, and where such is not the case, whether the agency employed
a permissible statutory construction).
196. Brownlee, 349 F.3d at 1354-55.
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197

employees.
The Federal Circuit held that the 1988 Act did not
change that approach, because the Act allowed defense costs in part,
198
where there was no conviction, but only if allowable under the FAR.
The Federal Circuit remanded the case to determine whether the
costs were incurred in a separate proceeding from that which
DynCorp’s branch manager plead guilty and whether they involved
199
the same misconduct.
VI. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
The decisions in 2003 further reflect the Federal Circuit’s strong
preference for the plain meaning approach to contract
interpretation.
A. WDC W. Carthage Associates v. United States
200

WDC W. Carthage Associates v. United States, involved a military
housing lease providing that the contractor/developer will repair any
damages, beyond normal wear and tear, caused by the government or
201
occupant.
The “cost of such repairs” would be paid by the
202
Although the government initially paid the full
government.
invoiced charges for carpet replacements due to damage beyond
normal wear and tear, after several years, the government announced
it would only pay the replacement cost less a prorated amount for
203
normal wear and tear on the carpets.
The Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”) agreed with the
government’s contract interpretation on a motion for summary
judgment. The Federal Circuit reversed, rejecting the CFC’s reliance
on landlord-tenant case law to interpret the lease’s meaning since
none of those cases dealt with the specific contract language at
204
hand. Instead, it found that the “plain terms” of the leases required
the government to pay the full cost of carpet replacements made
necessary by damage beyond normal wear and tear, without any
205
allowance for depreciation.
The Federal Circuit rejected the
government’s
“economic
windfall”
argument,
that
full
reimbursement for replacement carpeting prior to the end of the
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 1355.
Id.
Id. at 1356.
324 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1360.
Id.
Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1362-63.
Id. at 1363.
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carpet’s useful life gives the contractors an economic windfall, since it
206
was not the court’s duty to rewrite the terms of the lease. The court
also relied on the parties’ past conduct, specifically, the government’s
initial payment of full replacement cost, as evidence of the proper
207
construction of the leases.
The rejection of the government’s
economic windfall argument is particularly noteworthy in this
decision.
B. Forman v. United States
208

In Forman v. United States, Forman sought reimbursement of
expenses allegedly incurred pursuant to a pre-indictment plea
209
agreement with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”).
Under that agreement, Forman pledged to cooperate in the
establishment of a textile company, which would facilitate the FBI’s
210
investigation of a long-time clothing industry consultant. The FBI,
in turn, agreed to reimburse Forman for certain expenses and to
allow Forman to keep any profits arising from the legitimate
211
operation of the business.
Forman submitted a reimbursement
request, which the FBI denied on the grounds that Forman had failed
212
to obtain FBI authorization prior to incurring the expenses.
Forman filed suit in the CFC, which granted summary judgment in
the government’s favor because Forman failed to obtain FBI approval
213
prior to incurring the expenses as required by their agreement.
The Federal Circuit rejected the government’s contention that the
contract required Forman to obtain express or “specific” pre-approval
214
before incurring reimbursable expenses.
Rather, the plain
language required Forman to consult with an FBI representative
prior to incurring expenses as to the nature and purpose of the
215
expenses.
The agreement provided that the FBI would instruct
Forman not to proceed if the FBI determined the expenses
216
unnecessary for its goals.

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id.
329 F.3d 837 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 839-41.
Id. at 840.
Id. at 839-40.
Id. at 840-41.
Id. at 841.
Id. at 843.
Id.
Id.
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C. Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc.
217

In Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc., the United States appealed a
decision of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals finding
invalid the contractor’s release of potential claims against the
218
government contained in two modifications to a contract.
The
supply contract involved Meal, Ready to Eat (“MRE”) combat rations
219
for the Defense Logistics Agency. When the contractor repeatedly
missed deadlines for delivery of MREs, the government terminated
220
the contract for default. The contractor brought a claim for breach
of contract, constructive change, and improper default termination
221
in 1991.
Prior to termination of the contract, the parties entered into
contract modifications extending delivery dates and making a price
222
adjustment, in exchange for the release of claims.
For one of the
modifications, the contractor claimed, and the government denied,
the existence of a side agreement with the government to negotiate a
223
contract for the supply of additional MREs beginning in 1987. The
Board found that a valid side agreement existed based upon the
contractor’s letters sent before the execution of the modification and
the fact that the contracting officer never objected to the contents of
224
the letters at the time.
The contract contained an integration
clause, and the Board found that the side agreement was a part of the
modification, despite contrary testimony from the contracting officer,
225
which the Board did not find credible. Therefore, the contractor’s
release of claims against the government contained in the
modification could not be enforced due to the government’s breach
of the modification.
The Federal Circuit reversed, strongly endorsing the FAR’s policy
of settling disputes through modifications, which should be enforced
226
“absent a clear showing of invalidity.”
The parole evidence rule
does not apply to allow the inclusion of additional terms when the
227
Integration clauses, while
modification is completely integrated.
not dispositive, create a strong presumption of a fully-integrated
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

329 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1323-26.
Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1324.
Id.
Id. at 1323-24.
Id.
Id. at 1325.
Id.
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1328.
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228

agreement.
Use of extrinsic evidence with an integration clause
229
should be “extremely limited,” such as when the document is
obviously incomplete, or the merger clause was induced by fraud,
230
mistakes or other reasons to set aside the contract.
If there was a
side agreement, the contractor should have stricken or modified the
231
The court held that the modification was an
integration clause.
integrated document, and therefore the parole evidence rule did not
232
allow the inclusion of additional terms.
In a per curiam decision on a petition for panel rehearing and
233
rehearing en banc, the Federal Circuit affirmed its prior decision
and rejected Freedom’s argument that the side agreement was
integrated into the modification by virtue of a letter attached to the
234
modification containing the agreement.
The court on re-hearing
235
also reaffirmed that mere attachment cannot bind a party. Rather,
documents must clearly indicate that the attachments are to be
236
considered part of the contract.
This decision provides clear guidance and warning for unwary
contractors signing contract modifications. If there is an integration
clause in the modification, it will be enforced. If the parties did not
intend the modification’s release language to cover impact or delay
damages, one cannot rely on parole evidence, such as prior letters or
discussions, or post-modification conduct to argue different intent to
avoid the effect of the release language when the contract contains
an integration clause.
VII. DURESS
In the initial Freedom NY, Inc. case discussed above, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that the modification’s release
237
was unenforceable because of duress.
Citing the standard three
238
part test for duress, the government withheld a $700,000 progress
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1328-29 (citing JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 3.2(a) (4th ed. 1998)).
231. Freedom NY, Inc., 329 F.3d at 1329.
232. Id.
233. Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc., 346 F.3d 1359 (Fed Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
234. Id. at 1361.
235. See id. (explaining that both parties must agree what documents constitute a
single contract).
236. Id.
237. Freedom NY, Inc., 329 F.3d at 1329.
238. Id. (stating that to prove duress, a party must establish: (1) involuntary
acceptance of the other party’s terms, (2) a lack of alternatives under the
circumstances, and (3) that the other party’s coercive act created such
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payment, which the parties agreed caused the contractor to sign the
239
240
modification with the release. A coercive act need not be illegal.
Coercion may be shown by breach of an express contract term
without a good faith belief the action is permissible under the
241
contract.
Here, the government withheld the approved progress
payment for the sole purpose of pressuring the contractor to sign the
modification, which was not a reason listed under the contract for
242
withholding a payment. Thus, the government did not have a good
243
In an
faith belief that such a withholding was permissible.
important amplification of case law, the Federal Circuit rejected the
government’s argument that it withheld the payment in good faith
due to the government’s belief that the contractor defaulted, as this
244
justification was made after-the-fact.
The wrongfulness of the
245
government’s action must be judged at the time it was taken.
VIII. BID PROTESTS
The issue of clarifications and discussions often arise in bid
protests involving negotiated procurements. In Information Technology
246
& Applications Corp. v. United States, the protestor appealed from the
decision of the CFC denying its post-award bid protest. The protestor
complained, in part, that the Air Force violated 41 U.S.C. § 253b and
48 C.F.R. § 15.306, by conducting “discussions” with another bidder
(“RSIS”) and not with it (“ITAC”). According to ITAC, the
discussions were in the form of evaluation notices (“ENs”) to RSIS
that revealed past performance deficiencies and requested additional
information regarding performance. The CFC held that the ENs
were not “discussions” within the meaning of FAR 15.306(d) because
the agency had not made a determination of the competitive range
or allowed the offerors to correct deficiencies by revising their
proposals.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, citing revised regulatory language to
distinguish between “discussions” and “clarifications.” The Federal
Circuit held that ENs were not “discussions” because RSIS did not
have the opportunity to revise its proposal. The court held ENs were
circumstances).
239. Id. at 1324.
240. Id. at 1330.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1331.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Pigeon v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 167, 175 (1892).
246. 316 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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requests for clarification under 48 C.F.R. § 15.306(a)(2) which
provides that offerors “may be given the opportunity to clarify certain
aspects of proposals” and one aspect being described as “an offer’s
past performance information.” The ENs issued to RSIS sought
additional information to verify relevant past performance of
subcontractors and, thus, were clarifications. Rejecting the use of
dictionary definitions to interpret the statute, the Federal Circuit gave
247
deference to FAR definitions of the terms, as they represented “a
248
The Federal
reasonable interpretation of the statutory terms.”
Circuit also rejected ITAC’s argument that ENs were not clarifications
because they requested additional information. Any meaningful
clarification requires the offeror provide additional information to
249
the agency.
CONCLUSION
The government contract decisions issued in 2003 reflect
important developments in damages and default case law. The
Boards of Contract Appeals and the Court of Federal Claims will have
difficulty in uniformly applying these precedents. The Eichleay and
modified total cost decisions discussed herein reflect the Federal
Circuit’s continuing difficulty in applying rather simple damages
principles to the practical realities of doing business with the
government.

247. Id. at 1320-21.
248. Id. at 1322.
249. Id. at 1324.

